Education & Fellowship
UNIVERSITÄT ZÜRICH, Zurich, Switzerland
Master (M.A.) in Economics, July 2017
WASHBURN UNIVERSITY, Topeka, Kansas
Bachelor of Arts (B.A.), Economics, December 2012
Training and Experience
Giuliano Montanaro learned about Behavioral Economics and how it can be applied in different
areas and fields. At the University of Zurich, he was able to take different courses related to decision making, in which he learned both theory and practical matters, and he developed an interest in the use of games to study decision making. For his master’s thesis, he carried out a field experiment in Paraguay, for which he employed a decision-making game to measure the possible determinants of corrupt behavior.
Giuliano also has a vast experience in the field of education, as he has been teaching and tutoring for almost 15 years now. Currently, he dedicates his time to what he calls integral private education, sharing and teaching his vast ample knowledge in different areas and fields to all his students, of all levels, transforming the lives of these through education, knowledge, and support.
Research
Is it possible to induce learning-performance with cash incentives offered with a certain
probability in a similar way as with cash incentives offered for sure?
Giuliano Montanaro y Lukas von Fluë
Sought to better understand the different effects that different reward structures have on
performance. We conclude that having a probabilistic reward yields more effort in an activity and that rewards that are bigger in size tend to be more effective.
Corruption investigated in the lab: A follow up on Combining Top-Down and Bottom-up
Accountability: Evidence from a Bribery Experiment
Giuliano Montanaro, Lukas von Fluë, Robert Niederberger
The focus of this study is on the dynamics of corrupt behavior within a system over time. We were unable to find statistically significant results due to the following problems: our participant
pool, the non-lab, and the small sample size. This experiment was a good starting point to
replicate the results obtained by Serra (2011), as well as an attempt to bring new insight regarding the dynamics of different monitoring systems and the evolution of corrupt behavior
over time within a given system.
Master Thesis – Do inefficient anticorruption institutions promote corrupt behavior over
time? A field experiment in Paraguay
The focus of the study is to determine whether institutional inefficacy promotes corrupt behavior. To determine the degree to which institutional inefficiency promotes corrupt behavior, the behavior over time of participants was observed. Participants had to make decisions under two different scenarios: one in which there is high institutional inefficiency and the other in which there is high institutional efficiency. Due to a small sample size, no valid conclusions could be made.